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Highlights 
 With interest involved, self-disadvantageous inequity in preschoolers rose with 
age. 
 The improvement of inhibitory control explained this developmental trajectory. 
 Better theory of mind was associated with self-disadvantaging tendency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between 
preschoolers’ cognitive abilities and their fairness-related allocation 
behaviors in a dilemma of equity-efficiency conflict. Four- to 6-year-olds 
in Experiment 1 (N = 99) decided how to allocate 5 reward bells. In the 
first-party condition, preschoolers were asked to choose among giving 
more to self (self-advantageous inequity), wasting one bell (equity) or 
giving more to other (self-disadvantageous inequity); while in the third-
party condition, they chose to allocate the extra bell to one of two equally 
deserving recipients or to waste it. Results showed that compared to the 
pattern of decision in the third-party condition, preschoolers in the first-
party condition were more likely to give the extra bell to other (self-
disadvantaging behaviors), and age, inhibitory control (IC) and theory of 
mind (ToM) were positively correlated with their self-disadvantaging 
choices, but only IC mediated the relationship between age and self-
disadvantaging behaviors. Experiment 2 (N = 41) showed that IC still 
predicted preschoolers’ self-disadvantaging behaviors when they could 
choose only between equity and disadvantageous inequity. These results 
suggested that IC played a critical role in the implementation of self-
disadvantaging behaviors when this required the control over selfishness 
and envy. 
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Introduction 
Humans have regarded fairness as central to morality and social norms (Decety & 
Wheatley, 2015). Resource allocation is a crucial context to study humans’ 
understanding of fairness and its ontogeny (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013), and equality 
(everyone receives the same) is a simple rule of fairness (Baumard, Mascaro, & 
Chevallier, 2012; Rawls, 1971). As children grew older, they would take more factors 
such as effort into consideration and behave more adult-like (Piaget, 1932; see Hook 
& Cook, 1979 for a review). Thus, humans would distribute resources according to 
more complex rules like the equity principle (one receives what is proportional to 
contribution) (Deutsch, 1975). Fehr and Schmidt (1999) proposed the inequity 
aversion model as an explanation for humans’ fair behaviors, which challenged the 
standard self-interest model in economics. In addition to equality and equity, 
efficiency is another important principle in resource allocation. An efficient 
distribution is considered just (Rawls, 1971). 
Recent research revised the inequity aversion model by suggesting that 
individuals were not upset about inequity per se but were instead upset about the way 
it was created (Shaw, Choshen-Hillel, & Caruso, 2016). In real-life situations, 
however, resources cannot always be allocated equitably and individuals may 
encounter situations where equity is in conflict with efficiency (Choshen-Hillel, Shaw, 
& Caruso, 2015; Hsu, Anen, & Quartz, 2008; Okun, 1975). An example features a lab 
manager allocating several old computers and a powerful new one to graduate 
students. Any efficient plan would be making use of the new one, but doing so would 
sacrifice equity as the new one gives its user advantage over others (Choshen-Hillel et 
al., 2015). 
To make a relatively satisfactory allocation in such an allocation dilemma, one 
should be able to anticipate others’ social preferences before making a decision. For 
instance, inferring others’ emotional aversion for selfishness encourages us to 
conform to social norms. Consider a scene where resources could not be allocated 
equitably. First-party agents had to choose among giving more to self, wasting some 
to achieve equity and giving more to other, and previous research revealed that adults 
tended to give more to other which resulted in disadvantageous inequity but promoted 
efficient resource allocation (Choshen-Hillel et al., 2015). Similarly, third-party agents 
had to choose to give more to one of the two equally deserving recipients or to waste 
some; instead of prioritizing efficiency, adults were more likely to make an equitable 
allocation to avoid dissatisfaction from the recipients for the allocation decision 
(Choshen-Hillel et al., 2015). A developmental study showed that this self-
disadvantaging tendency increased as children grew older (Shaw et al., 2016). It has 
yet to be explained what specific cognitive abilities enable children to perform self-
disadvantaging behaviors. Thus, the current study was conducted mainly to examine 
the cognitive mechanisms underlying this developmental trajectory in the preschool 
period. By studying the potential cognitive components, it could provide insights into 
how humans develop to become social beings, especially in a period with rapid 
development in social behaviors such as the preschool period (Feldman, 2015). 
Findings on the cognitive mechanisms would also inform intervention to facilitate 
children’s moral development like training programs for the fairness-related cognitive 
components. 
From equity to self- disadvantageous inequity 
As children grew older, their knowledge of fairness accumulated. For example, 
Cooley and Killen (2015) found that 3.5- to 6-year-old children would make negative 
judgment for the allocator who gave an unequal allocation, even when it benefited the 
group; and older children took a fairness perspective more when they gave reasons for 
their negative judgment, such as “it’s just not fair to give them less”. Further, older 
children’s actual behaviors were more consistent with their knowledge of equity as 
they were more likely than younger children to propose equitable allocations (see 
Hook & Cook, 1979 for a review; also see Blake, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014) and 
reject inequity (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011).  
However, inequity could be perceived fair if it has legitimate reasons such as “A 
contributed more than B” (merit-based), “A needs more than B” (need-based), etc. 
(Feinberg, 1974; Rawls,1971). Adults view inequality or inequity as acceptable if it is 
achieved by an impartial procedure (Tyler, 2000). Children as young as 5 years old 
could understand procedural justice and accept an inequitable distribution made 
through an impartial lottery wheel (Grocke, Rossano, & Tomasello, 2015). But when 
allocating resources, an impartial procedure such as coin toss is not always 
appropriate or available (Keren & Teigen, 2010). When rewards could not be 
allocated equitably between two equally deserving recipients, adults (Choshen-Hillel 
et al., 2015; Gordon-Hecker, Rosensaft-Eshel, Pittarello, Shalvi, & Bereby-Meyer, 
2017) and older children (Shaw & Olson, 2012) as third-parties were more likely than 
younger ones to waste one reward for equity; but this tendency to waste resource 
became significantly weaker when the decision would influence their own benefit 
(Choshen-Hillel et al., 2015; Shaw et al., 2016). If children’s self-interest was 
involved, older ones were more inclined than younger ones to make self-
disadvantageous allocations to avoid wasting, i.e., a 1:2 allocation between self and 
other as opposed to a 1:1 one with the extra reward thrown away (Shaw et al., 2016). 
That is, inequity that would disadvantage participants was perceived fair if it was 
created by participants themselves instead of by third parties in the dilemma where 
equity was in conflict with efficiency (Choshen-Hillel et al., 2015). These findings 
indicate that children not only accept inequitable yet fair allocations, but even also 
actively make inequitable allocations if inequity does not entail unfairness (Shaw et 
al., 2016). In other words, people are not averse to inequity per se; instead, they would 
accept and even make an inequitable allocation if it can be justified.  
Shaw and colleagues provided an impartiality account for this self-
disadvantaging phenomenon (Shaw, 2013; Shaw et al., 2016). Acting impartially 
means not favoring any agent, especially not benefiting oneself if his (or her) self-
interest is involved, which serves to avoid being judged negatively by recipients or 
potential observers (Choshen-Hillel et al., 2015; DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013; Shaw, 
2013). First-party self-disadvantaging allocators sacrificed their own benefit but 
promoted others’ benefit, thus observed the principle of impartiality and achieved 
efficiency; third-party equitable allocators did not favor either recipient. Thus, both 
kinds of behaviors signal impartiality (Choshen-Hillel et al., 2015; Shaw, 2013; Shaw 
et al., 2016). Moreover, this self-disadvantaging behavior could not be fully explained 
by generosity or benevolence because older children as first parties were less likely 
than younger ones to make such a disadvantageous inequity if the extra reward has to 
be allocated among two other peers instead of one peer (Shaw et al., 2016). As 
children grew older, they became more concerned for appearing impartial (Shaw et 
al., 2016) and managing a prosocial reputation (Rapp, Engelmann, Herrmann, & 
Tomasello, 2019). In so doing, children need to infer how others would think about 
their behaviors and execute what they should do finally. Thus, the development of the 
self-disadvantaging behavior with age is probably associated with the improved socio-
cognitive and cognitive capacities.  
Potential cognitive mechanisms 
The evidence mentioned above indicated that as age increased, children would 
become adult-like in solving allocation problems. In regards to potential cognitive 
mechanisms, theory of mind (ToM), the ability to reason about others’ mental states 
and predict others’ behaviors accordingly (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), has been 
argued to be conducive to fair allocations (e.g., Sally & Hill, 2006). Preschoolers with 
improved ToM were more likely to consider inequality unacceptable than those 
without (Mulvey, Buchheister, & McGrath, 2016). Many developmental 
psychologists typically employed two economic exchange games to study the role of 
ToM in the development of children’s fairness-related behaviors, the Ultimatum 
Game (UG) and the Dictator Game (DG). In the UG, an anonymous proposer needs to 
propose an allocation plan and an anonymous responder can accept or reject it 
(Camerer, 2003). If the responder accepts the plan, the resource will be distributed as 
proposed; otherwise, neither of them will get any resource. Thus, the proposer needs 
to infer the desire of the responder in order to make the proposal accepted. The DG is 
a bit different in that the responder has to accept the proposal (Camerer, 2003). 
Previous studies found that ToM could positively predict children’s fair behaviors in 
the UG (Sally & Hill, 2006; Takagishi, Kameshima, Schug, Koizumi, & Yamagishi, 
2010) as well as the DG (Sally & Hill, 2006; Wu & Su, 2014; Yu, Zhu, & Leslie, 
2016). Given the definition of ToM, it could be assumed that ToM might help children 
better understand what kind of allocations the recipients would desire if the recipients 
have the right to reject it in the UG (“she may want me to split the rewards, or she will 
reject what I propose”), or how recipients and potential observers in the DG would 
think about their allocation behaviors (“she will be happy if I give half to her”).  
Similarly, in a context where resources cannot be allocated equitably, we 
supposed that preschoolers with higher levels of ToM might infer what others would 
consider socially desirable. If children’s own interest was involved, they would reason 
that “she will be happy if I give more to her and this can save the resource”, knowing 
that giving more to the other is preferable; if not, they would reason that “she will be 
sad if she receives less than the other one”, knowing that wasting the extra reward is 
preferable. Hence, we supposed that ToM would be positively associated with 
preschoolers’ self-disadvantaging behaviors. 
Moreover, in dealing with fairness issues, one usually needs to find a balance 
between the desire to maximize his or her own interest and a motivation to conform to 
social norms (e.g., Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). Inhibitory 
control (IC), an ability to suppress prepotent responses when pursuing a cognitively 
represented goal (Diamond, 2013), is positively related to fair behaviors (e.g., Blake, 
Piovesan, Montinari, Warneken, & Gino, 2015). Some studies also demonstrated a 
causal relation between IC and fairness-related behaviors. Steinbeis and Over (2017) 
found that children shared more rewards with anonymous peers in the DG after their 
IC was temporally enhanced by listening to a story in which the protagonist exerted 
IC to resist temptation than after listening to a neutral control story; and this priming 
effect could not be explained by perceptions of fairness. Similarly, Steinbeis (2018) 
had a group of children complete a Stop-signal-reaction-time task before allocation 
task to lower their IC temporally, and found that this experiment group shared less 
rewards with peers in the subsequent DG than the control group did. These findings 
suggest that IC plays a crucial role in inhibiting one’s selfish impulse and aligning 
one’s behavior with prosocial norms. Thus, we proposed that IC would be associated 
with a tendency to divide resources in an unselfish way when children have to make a 
trade-off between equity and efficiency. 
To achieve the cognitive goal of meeting social norms or what is socially 
desirable, in addition to inhibiting one’s selfish impulse, IC could also play a role in 
suppressing other internal predispositions like envy (Rawls, 1971; Takahashi et al., 
2009) or concern for efficiency (Engelmann & Strobel, 2004; Rawls, 1971). Children 
would not only focus on the absolute gains, but also their relative gains compared 
with peers (Blake et al., 2014). Thus, in Shaw and colleagues’ study (2016), giving 
such a disadvantageous inequity allocation demanded inhibiting one’s envious 
impulse and social comparison preference (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Festinger, 1954; 
Sznycer et al., 2017; Takahashi et al., 2009), especially when children as first-parties 
could choose only between making a self-disadvantageous allocation or an equitable 
allocation. And when a third-party allocates resources between two equally deserving, 
anonymous recipients, making an equitable allocation means overriding one’s concern 
for improving efficiency of allocation in the dilemma of equity-efficiency conflict. 
Thus, IC should play a substantial role in inhibiting these predispositions if a person 
wants to behave impartially. 
Neuroscience studies provided more evidence for such a role. Steinbeis and 
colleagues (2012) investigated decisions of 6- to 13-year-old children in the UG and 
DG as well as neural mechanisms of the process. The difference in offer size between 
UG and DG reflects the ability to reconcile one’s own needs and social norms 
(Camerer, 2003; Steinbeis et al., 2012). They found that age and IC were positively 
correlated with the difference between amount allocated to the other in the UG and 
DG, but not correlated with their social norm understanding like fairness judgment. 
Moreover, the activation in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), an area associated 
with IC (Miller & Cohen, 2001), as well as its cortical thickness was positively 
associated with IC and the difference in offer size between UG and DG (Steinbeis et 
al., 2012). The evidence indicated that IC helps individuals narrow the gap between 
their knowledge of social norms and actual behaviors. In other words, IC would help 
align behaviors with children’s knowledge about fairness. Thus, children would 
demonstrate more self-disadvantaging behaviors as age increased because their IC 
improved with age. 
Thus, ToM and IC are potential cognitive basis of children’s self-disadvantaging 
behaviors. Specifically, ToM enables children to infer the recipient’s social 
preference, and IC would help children inhibit their selfishness and envy. We chose 4- 
to 6-year-old preschoolers for two reasons. First, preschoolers’ understanding of 
equity and impartiality developed fast during the preschool period. For example, 5-
year-olds make more equitable distributions than 4-year-olds (Lane & Coon, 1972), 
and 5-year-olds also could understand procedural justice and accept an inequitable 
distribution made through an impartial procedure (Grocke et al., 2015). Second, their 
ToM and IC also develop fast. Children from about 4 years old on could pass the 
false-belief task, which meant that they could reason about others’ beliefs (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001). IC also began to develop rapidly at age 4 with behavioral 
improvement and functional changes in the neural substrates (Davidson, Amso, 
Anderson, & Diamond, 2006). 
The current study 
In summary, the current study was designed to investigate the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying the development of the self-disadvantaging behavior in the 
preschool period. Findings were expected to give a cognitive account of such age-
related difference in self-disadvantaging behaviors and shed light on how to promote 
children’s actual fairness-related behaviors.  
We employed a real-life-like resource allocation task designed specifically for 
young children. We randomly assigned 4- to 6-year-old children into the first-party or 
the third-party conditions in Experiment 1. In the first-party condition, children were 
asked to choose among creating a self-advantaging inequity (self-benefit), wasting one 
extra reward bell (equity), and creating a self-disadvantageous inequity (other-benefit); 
in the third-party condition, their decisions were not related to their own benefits, and 
they needed to allocate an odd number of toy bells between two equally deserving 
recipients. We hypothesized that in the first-party condition, the tendency to create a 
self-disadvantageous inequity would be positively associated with age, IC and ToM; in 
the third-party condition, the tendency to adhere to equity would be positively 
associated with age, IC and ToM. However, it was to be explored, to exhibit the self-
disadvantaging behavior, whether one should only inhibit selfish impulses with IC or 
should also inhibit other tendencies like envy that prevented one from conforming to 
social norms. Thus, we conducted Experiment 2 to reveal the specific role of IC with 
fewer choices. Children in Experiment 2 could only choose between equity and other-
benefit. Additionally, we proposed that the development of IC and ToM capabilities 
could explain the age-related differences in children’s self-disadvantaging behaviors 
when this required inhibition of prepotent responses and reasoning how others would 
perceive the decisions. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants  
A total of 101 children aged 4 to 6 participated in this study, but 2 subjects were 
excluded because they disliked the toy bells as rewards for allocation, resulting in a 
final sample of 99 (Mage = 65.01 months, SD = 9.35, range = 47.80 to 78.44; 55 girls). 
The sample was drawn from 2 private kindergartens in Beijing, China, which served 
mostly children from middle class families. All subjects were ethnic Chinese, were 
born and had lived in mainland China all or most of the time. They were randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions: the first-party condition (N = 54, Mage = 64.96 
months, SD = 9.04, range = 48.43 to78.44; 29 girls) and the third-party condition (N = 
45, Mage = 65.07 months, SD = 9.81, range = 47.80 to 78.08; 26 girls). Each group had 
an even gender composition (ps > .100). Informed consent was obtained from the 
school authorities and parents. 
Procedure 
A female experimenter tested each participant individually in a sequence of four 
tasks, which took about 25min in total in a quiet room at the participant’s 
kindergarten. Each subject was instructed to complete, first, a resource allocation task 
(4 min), then a training with the future probability ordering task for the preparation of 
measuring ToM (6 min), followed by an interpretive theory-of-mind probability task 
measuring ToM (10 min), and finally a day-night task measuring IC (5 min). Each 
child was awarded 2 bells for participation after finishing all the tasks. 
Resource Allocation Task. We asked participants to help allocate the reward bells, 
which was adapted from previous studies (Shaw et al., 2016; Shaw & Olson, 2012). 
To place children in a situation involving their self-interest, each child in the first-
party condition was asked to complete a filler task (a game of feeding animals) under 
the instruction of the experimenter. Then the child was told by the experimenter that 
she would leave to check another child’s performance. Later, the experimenter came 
back, and the participant was told to allocate 5 bells as reward. They could choose 
among allocating the fifth bell to self, no one and other. Children in the third-party 
condition were directly asked to choose to allocate the fifth bell to one of the two 
equally deserving recipients or to waste it (see details in the supplementary material). 
This one-shot play design would reduce the possibility of expecting future reciprocity 
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). 
Future likelihood ordering task. This task was employed to train each child to indicate 
estimated probabilities from 1 to 10 demonstrated by stacked bars in an arrow for 
subsequent assessment of ToM (Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Harvey, 2014; see details in the 
supplementary material).  
Interpretive Theory-of-Mind Probability (ITomP) Task. The ITomP task (Lagattuta et 
al., 2014) could be used to measure the mindreading ability for preschoolers. We 
adopted the “knowledgeable” condition of the task to test 4- to 6-year-olds’ ToM 
instead of false belief tasks, which might be too easy for 5- to 6-year-olds (Lagattuta 
et al., 2014; Wellman et al., 2001). The task included 2 trials in total (the cloud and 
the castle trials). Participants were first shown the actual picture in each trial. And 
then they were asked to infer how a “naïve” agent would think what the actual picture 
was when he (or she) could only see an ambiguous section of the actual picture from a 
window (an arc for the cloud trial and a right angle for the castle trial). There were 
two indicators of this task, the inferred probability of actual pictures (a negative 
indicator of ToM) and prototypical pictures (a positive indicator of ToM). 
Day-Night Task. In order to measure IC, the participant was asked to complete a 
Stroop-like task, i.e. day-night task (Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Monsour, 2011). It featured 
ten pictures of the sun and ten pictures of the moon. This version of task was better 
for the current study because classic versions might be too simple for older 
preschoolers (Lagattuta et al., 2011). The participant was asked to say the opposite 
name of each picture as quickly as possible (“day” for a moon, “night” for a sun). 
After answering four practice trials correctly, they would enter a formal test of twenty 
trials.  
Coding and Analysis  
Our study aimed to explore the underlying cognitive mechanisms of self-
disadvantaging behaviors in preschoolers. For a cross-condition analysis, condition 
was coded into a binary variable (0 = third-party condition, 1= first-party condition), 
and allocation was first coded into a binary variable (0 = not to give to other, 1 = to 
give to other). Allocation to either recipient in the third-party condition would be both 
inequitable and unfair, yet in the first-party condition, allocation to the other would 
seem impartial. Thus, if allocation choice would be predicted by certain variables of 
interest, condition was expected to play a moderating role in such a relation. Notably, 
for the first-party condition, allocation decision was re-coded into an ordinal variable 
(0 = self-benefit, 1= equity, and 2 = other-benefit). Since the self-benefit choice was 
self-centered, selfish, and would be socially undesirable, so we coded it as 0; throwing 
the extra bell away preserved equity but failed to take efficiency into account, so we 
coded it as 1; the other-benefit choice would be both efficient and impartial, and 
according to previous studies, older children were more likely than younger children 
to choose other-benefit over equity (Shaw et al., 2016), similar to what adults did 
(Choshen-Hill et al., 2015), so we coded it as 2. In the IToMP task, the inferred 
probabilities of actual and prototypical pictures were selected as the previous study 
did (Lagattuta et al., 2014). They were recorded as scores ranging from 1 to 10. The 
accuracy rate of the IC task was recorded in percentage values. 
We mainly used R 3.2.0 (R Core Team, 2013) to analyze the data. The glm 
function was employed for logistic regression analysis of children’s choices across 
conditions (1 or 0: to give to other or not) (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in 
Zurich, 2014a), the multinom function from the nnet package was employed for 
multinomial logit regression of children’s choices in the first-party condition (self-
benefit, equity, other-benefit) (Venables & Ripley, 2002), and the polr function from 
the MASS package was employed for ordinal logistic regression of the ternary 
outcomes in the first-party condition (0 to 2: self-benefit, equity, other-benefit) (Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, 2014b). We estimated effect sizes by 
calculating odds ratios (ORs) and their 95% confidence intervals (CIs). We 
standardized the continuous variables before the analysis in order to make units 
comparable (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). To conduct a mediation analysis in 
order to investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying the development of 
impartial behaviors, we used the Preacher and Hayes (2008) mediation setup for the 
binary outcome variable, whereas the method reported in Liu and colleagues’ study 
(2015) for the ordinal outcome variable.  
Results 
Preliminary analysis 
Zero-order correlations among focal variables were conducted for the first-party 
condition, the third-party condition and across the conditions (see Table 1S in the 
supplementary material). Children in the two groups did not differ in age, ToM or IC 
(ps > .100). There were either no gender differences in age, ToM, IC or inclination to 
give the extra bell to other (ps > .100). Thus, gender was not further analyzed. 
The development of impartial behaviors in preschoolers  
First, we conducted a binomial logistic regression in which children’s choices (1 or 
0: to give to other or not) served as the dependent variable, and age, condition along 
with the interaction between them served as the independent variables. The effect of 
the interaction was significant, b = 1.21, SE = 0.49, z = 2.49, p = .013, OR = 3.35, 
95% CI [1.35, 9.17]. And the effects of age and condition on children’s choices were 
also significant, b = -0.73, SE = 0.35, z = -2.13, p = .034, OR = 0.48, 95% CI [0.23, 
0.90]; b = -1.48, SE = 0.46, z = -3.23, p = .001, OR = 0.23, 95% CI [0.09, 0.55], 
respectively; McFadden’s R2 = .13.  
Considering the choices across conditions were not parallel, thus we analyzed the 
relationship between age and children’s choices for each condition separately. For the 
first-party condition, we conducted an ordinal logistic regression in which children’s 
choices (0 to 2: self-benefit, equity or other-benefit) served as the dependent variable, 
and age as the independent variable. The effect of age on children’s choices was 
significant, such that older children were more likely to choose equity and other-
benefit, b = 0.70, SE = 0.28, t = 2.50, p = .012, OR = 2.01, 95% CI [1.18, 3.57]; 
McFadden’s R2 = .06. The multinomial logistic regression for the first-party condition 
also showed that age could significantly predict children’s choices, χ2(2) = 8.28, p 
= .016, McFadden’s R2 = .07. For the third-party condition, we conducted a binomial 
logistic regression in which children’s choices (1 or 0: to give to other or not) served 
as the dependent variable and age as the independent variable. As children grew older, 
they were less inclined to create inequity in order to achieve impartiality, b = -0.73, 
SE = 0.35, z = -2.13, p = .034, OR = 0.48, 95% CI [0.23, 0.90]; McFadden’s R2 = .09. 
In addition, we also examined whether children were choosing at random for each 
condition. For the first-party condition, Chi-square goodness-of-fit test showed that 
the proportion of 4-year-old children (11 out of 17) choosing self-benefit was 
significantly higher than the chance level (1/3), χ2(2) = 8.94, p = .011, while 
statistically, 5-year-olds (6 out of 19) and 6-year-olds (3 out of 18) chose self-benefit 
at chance level, χ2(2) = 0.74, p = .692 and χ2(2) = 3.00, p = .223, respectively (see the 
left panel of Figure 1). For the third-party condition, the Chi-square goodness-of-fit 
test showed that only the number of 6-year-old children (9 out of 14) choosing equity 
(waste the extra bell) was significantly at above chance level (1/3), χ2(1) = 6.04, p 
= .014, while statistically, 4-year-olds (2 out of 12) and 5-year-olds (7 out of 19) 
chose equity at chance level, χ2(1) = 1.50, p = .221 and χ2(1) = 0.11, p = .746, 
respectively (see the right panel of Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The underlying mechanisms of impartial behaviors in preschoolers 
As the correlation analysis implied, preschoolers’ impartial behaviors were 
positively correlated with their IC and ToM. Specially, their choices were significantly 
correlated with the accuracy rate of IC task and the inferred probability of 
prototypical pictures in IToMP task. Hence, we performed regression analysis using 
these indicators. First, we conducted a binomial logistic regression, in which 
children’s choices (1 or 0: to give to other or not) served as the dependent variable, 
and age, condition, the accuracy rate of IC task, the inferred probability of 
prototypical pictures, the interaction between the accuracy rate of IC task and 
condition (1 = the first-party condition, 0 = the third-party condition), plus the 
interaction between the inferred probability of prototypical pictures and condition 
served as the independent variables. The results showed that the interaction between 
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Figure 1. Proportion of children choosing self-benefit in the first-party 
condition or equity in the third-party condition, presented separately 
for age. * p < 0.05 
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condition (First-party) and the accuracy rate of IC task was significant, b = 4.22, SE = 
1.06, z = 3.98, p < .001, OR = 68.01, 95% CI [10.30, 678.20]; the effects of condition 
and the accuracy rate of IC task on children’s choices were also significant, b = -2.73, 
SE = 0.74, z = -3.71, p < .001, OR = 0.07, 95% CI [0.01, 0.24]; b = -1.75, SE = 0.72, z 
= -2.42, p = .016, OR = 0.17, 95% CI [0.03, 0.60], respectively. However, condition 
did not show a significant moderating effect on the relation between the inferred 
probability of prototypical pictures and children’s choices, b = 0.54, SE = 0.51, z = 
1.06, p = .288, OR = 1.71, 95% CI [0.63, 4.70] (see Table 1); McFadden’s R2 = .34. 
Table 1 
Results of logistic regression on giving to other or not for Experiment 1 
Variables b SE z p OR 95% CI 
(Intercept) 1.11 0.51 2.19 .028 3.03 [1.27, 9.78] 
Age (months) -.29 0.36 -0.80 .422 0.75 [0.37, 1.51] 
Condition (First-party) -2.73 0.74 -3.71 < .001 0.07 [0.01, 0.24] 
IC accuracy -1.75 0.72 -2.42 .016 0.17 [0.03, 0.60] 
Prototypical pictures -.32 0.36 -0.89 .375 0.73 [0.35, 1.47] 
Condition (First-party): 
IC accuracy 
4.22 1.06 3.98 < .001 68.01 [10.30, 678.20] 
Condition (First-party): 
Prototypical pictures 
0.54 0.51 1.06 .288 1.71 [0.63, 4.70] 
 
We analyze the contribution of IC and ToM to preschooler’s impartial behaviors for 
each condition separately. For the first-party condition, we conducted a multinomial 
logistic regression and an ordinal logistic regression in which age, the accuracy of IC 
task, the inferred probability of prototypical pictures served as the independent 
variables, and children’s choices served as the dependent variable. The results of 
multinomial logistic regression showed that only the effect of IC on children’s choices 
was significant, χ2(2) = 17.10, p < .001, McFadden’s R2 = .24 (see Table 2 for 
comparisons based on log odds). The results of ordinal logistic regression showed 
consistent evidence that the accuracy rate of IC task could only significantly predict 
children’s choices after controlling for age, b = 1.20, SE = 0.40, t = 3.03, p = .002, OR 
= 3.31, 95% CI [1.63, 7.82], while the effects of age, the inferred probability for 
prototypical pictures were not significant (ps > .05); McFadden’s R2 = .17. For the 
third-party condition, the results of binomial logistic regression showed that the 
accuracy rate of IC task could only significantly predict children’s choice of not 
wasting after controlling for age, b = -1.76, SE = 0.74, z = -2.39, p = .017, OR = 0.17, 
95% CI [0.03, 0.61], but the effects of other predictors were not significant (ps > .05); 
McFadden’s R2 = .27. 
Table 2 
Multinomial logistic regression for children’s choices in the first-party condition 
 
Independent 
variables 
Comparisons based on log odds 
Equity vs. 
Self-benefit 
Other-benefit vs. 
Self-benefit 
Other-benefit vs. 
Equity 
Age (months) 0.36 -0.16 -0.52 
IC accuracy 0.37 2.69* 2.32* 
Prototypical 
pictures 
0.88 0.92 0.04 
Note: * p < .01. Self-benefit means children giving the extra bell to self, equity means 
children wasting the extra bell, and other-benefit means children giving the extra bell 
to other. 
 
In order to explain the developmental trajectory of impartial behaviors during the 
preschool period, we tested the mediation effect of IC on the relation between age and 
children’s choices for each condition. For the first-party condition, age served as an 
independent variable (X), the accuracy rate of IC task served as a mediator (M), and 
children’s choices (0 to 2: self-benefit, equity or other-benefit) served as a dependent 
variable (Y). We found that as age increased, children were more likely to choose 
equity and other-benefit (c = 0.70, SE = 0.28, t = 2.50, p = .012, OR = 2.01, 95% CI 
[1.18, 3.57]), and their accuracy rate of IC task increased (a = 0.64, SE = 0.13, t = 
4.99, p < .001). Moreover, children with higher levels of IC had a stronger tendency 
for equity and other-benefit choices (b = 1.18, SE = 0.40, t = 2.96, p = .003, OR = 
3.24, 95% CI [1.59, 7.68]), but the direct effect was not significant now, c’ = 0.15, SE 
= 0.33, t = 0.46, p = .649, OR = 1.16, 95% CI [0.60, 2.24] (see the top panel of Figure 
2). The indirect effect of age on children’s choices in the first-party condition through 
IC was significant, ab = 0.75, 95% CI [0.17, 1.32] (Liu, Zhang, & Luo, 2015). 
Likewise, for the third-party condition, age served as an independent variable (X), 
the accuracy rate of IC task served as a mediator (M), and children’s choices (1 or 0: 
to give to other or not) served as a dependent variable (Y). The results showed that as 
age increased, children were less likely to give the extra bell to one of the recipients (c 
= -0.73, SE = 0.35, z = -2.13, p = .034, OR = 0.48, 95% CI [0.23, 0.90]), and the 
accuracy rate of IC task increased (a = 0.40, SE = 0.11, t = 3.55, p = .001). Moreover, 
children with higher levels of IC were less inclined to give the extra bell to the 
recipients (a stronger tendency to equitable allocations) (b = -1.85, SE = 0.72, z = -
2.59, p = .010, OR = 0.16, 95% CI [0.03, 0.53]), but the direct effect was not 
significant now, c’ = -0.33, SE = 0.43, z = -0.75, p = .453, OR = 0.72, 95% CI [0.29, 
1.90] (see the bottom panel of Figure 2). The indirect effect of age on children’s 
choice in the third-party condition through IC was significant, ab = -0.75, 95% CI [-
2.22, -0.11] (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Thus, the results across conditions showed that 
the accuracy rate of IC task played a fully mediator in the relation of age on 
preschoolers’ impartial behaviors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The current results of the self-disadvantaging phenomenon and its development 
replicated findings from previous studies (Choshen-Hillel et al., 2015; Shaw et al., 
2016). There were asymmetric developmental trajectories in children’s impartial 
behaviors across contexts. Six-year-old children did not show an unselfish tendency in 
the first-party condition whereas they showed a tendency for equity in the third-party 
condition.  
More importantly, we found that IC was a full mediator for the age-related 
differences of impartial behaviors, while ToM might also make some contributions to 
Accuracy rate 
of IC task 
First-party condition 
Age 
Accuracy rate 
of IC task 
Self-benefit, equity 
or other-benefit 
a = 0.64** b = 1.18
** 
c' = 0.15 
c = 0.70* 
Figure 2. IC mediated the effect of age on children’s choices in different conditions. The 
mediation effects of IC in both conditions were tested separately. Results showed that IC 
played a full mediating role in the relation between age and children’s choices in both 
conditions. Note: *p < .05, **p ≤ .01. 
Third-party condition 
c = 0.73* 
c' = 0.33 
Age 
Give to other 
or not 
a = 0.40** b = -1.85
** 
it, but its particular role was not confirmed. It suggested that IC played a substantial 
role in implementing an impartial allocation, which was consistent with findings on 
children’s fair behaviors obtained with other paradigms in previous studies (e.g., 
Aguilar-Pardo, Martínez-Arias, & Colmenares, 2013; Blake et al., 2015; Liu et al., 
2016). The choices in Experiment 1, however, could not fully tell whether the role of 
IC was only for suppressing one’s selfish impulses because children in the first-party 
condition could choose among self-benefit, equity or other-benefit. Whether IC would 
still play a role in children’s self-disadvantaging behaviors when children were forced 
to choose between equity and other-benefit remained a question. As the definition of 
IC suggested, one has to suppress his (or her) impulses or habits in order to behave in 
a socially desirable way (Diamond, 2013). Individuals also had other impulses like 
envy. Thus we conducted Experiment 2 to find more evidence about how IC played a 
role in implementing this self-disadvantaging behavior.  
 
Experiment 2 
In the context of equity-efficiency conflict, giving more to other when personal 
benefit was involved is a more socially desirable choice than wasting it (Choshen-
Hillel et al., 2015; Shaw et al., 2016). Considering the three choices among which 
children could choose, we could not fully figure out the specific role of IC in 
implementing such a self-disadvantaging behavior. Whether IC played a role only in 
inhibiting one’s selfishness or IC functioned as an executor to align one’s behavior 
with social norms irrespective of different internal predispositions remained to be 
further examined. Thus, we employed the resource allocation task in the first-party 
condition of Experiment 1with two limited choices, i.e., equity or other-benefit. The 
choices in Experiment 2 were more parallel to the third-party condition in Experiment 
1 because in both experiments children needed to decide between allocating the extra 
bell to other or wasting it. The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate to what extent 
preschoolers’ self-disadvantaging behaviors were associated with IC for inhibiting 
envious impulses and ToM for inferring which choice was more socially desirable. 
We hypothesized that higher IC and ToM would still be positively associated with 
more self-disadvantaging decisions.  
Method 
Participants 
G*Power (version 3.1) (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) showed that a 
sample size of 41 was required for a power (1-β) of .80 to detect an effect of f2 = .20 
at α = .05. We thus recruited another 41 children (Mage = 59.63 months, SD = 5.26, 
range = 48.33 to 70.63; 23 girls) coming from the same kindergartens as Experiment 1 
participated Experiment 2. All subjects liked the reward bells. They were ethnic 
Chinese, were born and had lived in mainland China all or most of the time. Informed 
consent was obtained from the school authorities and parents. 
Procedure 
The procedures in the self-disadvantaging condition of Experiment 2 were 
similar to those in the first-party condition of Experiment 1, except that the “giving to 
self” option was removed in the resource allocation task. The order of the choices of 
giving more to other and wasting the extra reward in narration was counterbalanced 
between subjects. After completing the allocation task, participants were instructed to 
complete the measurement of ToM and IC as Experiment 1. 
Results 
Data of 4- and 5-year-olds from the third-party condition of Experiment 1 and 
from the self-disadvantaging condition of Experiment 2 were compared to control the 
effect of age. For this pooled sample of 72 (NExp.1 third-party = 31, NExp.2 = 41), zero-
order correlations among variables in the self-disadvantaging condition of Experiment 
2 were conducted (see Table 2S in the supplementary material). 
We conducted a binomial logistic regression, in which children’s choices (1 or 0: 
self-disadvantaging or equity) served as the dependent variable, and age, condition, 
the accuracy rate of IC task, the inferred probability of prototypical pictures, the 
interaction between the accuracy rate of IC task and condition (1 = the self-
disadvantaging condition in Experiment 2, 0 = the third-party condition in Experiment 
1), plus the interaction between the inferred probability of prototypical pictures and 
condition served as the independent variables. Results showed that the interaction 
between condition (Self-disadvantaging condition) and the accuracy rate of IC task 
was significant, b = 2.62, SE = 0.96, z = 2.73, p = .006, OR = 13.76, 95% CI [2.62, 
119.64]; the effect of the accuracy rate of IC task on children’s choices was also 
significant, b = -1.78, SE = 0.88, z = -2.02, p = .043, OR = 0.17, 95% CI [0.02, 0.73]. 
However, condition did not show a significant moderating effect on the relation 
between the inferred probability of prototypical pictures and children’s choices (1 or 
0: to give to other or not), b = 0.46, SE = 0.60, z = 0.76, p = .448, OR = 1.58, 95% CI 
[0.49, 5.48] (see Table 3); McFadden’s R2 = .21. 
Table 3 
Results of logistic regression on self-disadvantaging or equity for Experiment 2 
Variables b SE z p OR 95% CI 
(Intercept) 1.25 0.60 2.06 .039 3.47 [1.21, 14.15] 
Age (months) -0.06 0.34 -0.18 .859 0.94 [0.48, 1.83] 
Condition (Self-disadvantaging) -1.32 0.72 -1.85 .065 0.27 [0.05, 0.98] 
IC accuracy -1.78 0.88 -2.02 .043 0.17 [0.02, 0.73] 
Prototypical pictures -0.55 0.48 -1.16 .248 0.58 [0.20, 1.42] 
Condition (Self-disadvantaging): 
IC accuracy 
2.62 0.96 2.73 .006 13.76 [2.62, 119.64] 
Condition (Self-disadvantaging): 
Prototypical pictures 
0.46 0.60 0.76 .448 1.58 [0.49, 5.48] 
 
We analyze the contribution of IC and ToM to preschooler’s impartial behaviors for 
each condition separately. The results of the binomial logistic regression analysis for 
the self-disadvantaging condition showed that the accuracy rate of IC task could only 
significantly predict children’s self-disadvantaging choice after controlling for age, b 
= 0.98, SE = 0.46, z = 2.12, p = .034, OR = 2.68, 95% CI [1.19, 7.66], while the 
effects of age, the inferred probability for prototypical pictures were not significant 
(ps > .05); McFadden’s R2 = .14 (see the left panel of Figure 3). For the third-party 
condition, similarly, the accuracy rate of IC task could only significantly predict 
children’s equity choice after controlling for age, b = -1.91, SE = 0.92, z = -2.09, p 
= .037, OR = 0.15, 95% CI [0.02, 0.66], but the effects of other predictors were not 
significant (ps > .05); McFadden’s R2 = .28 (see the right panel of Figure 3). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, children were faced with limited choices between creating self-
disadvantageous inequity and wasting the extra piece of resource. We found that IC 
was still positively predictive of their self-disadvantaging choices. This result 
eliminated the possibility that IC only played a role in overriding one’s selfishness. 
Instead, it would also serve to inhibit one’s envy in allocation. We speculated that 
preschoolers might perceive giving the extra bell to other as more socially desirable 
than wasting it if their self-interest was involved (Choshen-Hillel et al., 2015; Shaw et 
al., 2016) because some children could give justified reasons like “I don’t want to get 
the bell rusted” or “then I will yield it to her” as they talked to themselves when 
making the decisions.  
Figure 3. Binomial logistic regression of accuracy of the IC task on probability of 
giving to other in each condition. 
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This self-disadvantaging phenomenon had something in common with previous 
findings with other paradigms (e.g., Grocke et al., 2015; Schmidt, Svetlova, Johe, & 
Tomasello, 2016), i.e., children’s understanding of fairness is relatively sophisticated 
because they would consider inequity with justified reasons as fair. They would not 
only accept inequitable distributions made through an impartial lottery wheel instead 
of a partial one (Grocke et al., 2015), but also make inequitable distributions with 
legitimate reasons instead of idiosyncratic reasons such as “I just want more” 
(Schmidt et al., 2016). They would even make a self-disadvantageous inequity for 
efficiency as Shaw and colleagues’ study (2016) as well as the current study 
suggested. All these findings indicated that children would display social behaviors 
consistent with social expectations (House, 2018), and IC would help to fill the gap 
between what is socially desirable and their actual performance (Diamond, 2013; Liu 
et al., 2016; Steinbeis et al., 2012) 
General Discussion 
The present study examined the cognitive mechanisms underlying the 
development of self-disadvantaging behaviors among preschoolers. In line with 
previous findings (Shaw et al., 2016), we replicated that older children in both the 
first-party and third-party conditions exhibited a stronger tendency than younger ones 
to make impartial decisions (some cultural and social-economic differences of the 
self-disadvantaging phenomenon were discussed in the supplementary material). 
Moreover, impartial behaviors increased with the development of IC and ToM. We 
also found that IC could explain the age-related differences in children’s impartial 
behaviors where IC fully mediated the relation between age and impartial behaviors in 
both the first-party and third-party conditions. 
The role of IC 
We found that children with higher levels of IC tended to make inequitable yet 
impartial allocations, which disadvantaged themselves, instead of wasting the extra 
piece of resource. In Experiment 1, children in the first-party condition had three 
choices in total: self-benefit, equity or other-benefit. As Sanfey and colleagues (2003) 
argued, one had to inhibit his (or her) selfish impulse before he or she would decide 
not to choose “the self” option, because one had to make a balance between 
maximizing economic self-interest, and conforming to the social norm, and 
“inhibition” of selfishness was required for the latter.  
Selfishness, however, is not the only form of prepotent response to inhibit if one 
is to meet the demand of social norms in social interactions. In Experiment 2, children 
had to choose between giving more to other (other-benefit) or wasting the extra bell 
(equity). Previous studies showed that children had a strong inequity aversion, 
especially for disadvantageous inequity (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011). In Fehr and 
colleagues’ study (2008), most 5- to 6-year-olds chose the equal allocation (1:1) 
instead of the self-disadvantaging allocation (1:2). Such a strong tendency for 
egalitarianism might be associated with envy (Dawes, Johnson, Smirnov, Fowler, & 
McElreath, 2007; Sznycer et al., 2017), which was a dark side of human nature (Smith 
& Kim, 2007). According to the definition of envy (Smith & Kim, 2007), getting 
fewer desired rewards (note that all the children recruited in the current study liked 
the bells very much) than another person for equal performance would evoke feelings 
of inferiority or resentment. Thus, unlike just providing two choices (1:1 or 1:2) in 
Fehr and colleagues’ study (2008), when emphasizing the possibility of wasting the 
extra bell, children in both Experiments 1 and 2 needed to suppress their impulses of 
envying the other getting more desired reward for equal effort if they chose to give 
more to other. 
 The current study extended previous findings that IC played a critical role in 
compliance with equality in the DG (Blake et al., 2015) and enforcing fair norms 
(Steinbeis, 2018) as children grew older. We speculated that IC also contributed to 
impartiality including achieving equity at the expense of wasting some extra resource 
as third-parties and making a self-disadvantageous inequity as first-parties. Taken 
together, it suggested that IC played a substantial role in implementing fair decisions, 
including inhibiting one’s selfishness and other prepotent responses like envy. 
Notably, the current format of the resource allocation task is essential for 
capturing the effect of IC on fair behaviors. This format ensured whether children 
decided to disadvantage themselves, keep equity, or disadvantage others, they had to 
make one active (motor) choice. In contrast, in Smith and colleagues’ study (2013), 
children in the resource allocation task did not need to do anything if they wanted to 
disadvantage others. In resource allocation tasks, asking children which allocation 
(e.g., 4:0, 3:1, 2:2) they want to choose may be more likely to detect the effect of IC 
than asking children how many items they want to give away, because the former 
format involves inhibiting a motor response such as choosing the 4:0 allocation if 
children want to behave prosocially. Thus, future studies in this area should make all 
the choices parallel. 
The role of ToM  
The present study found that ToM was positively correlated with children’s 
impartial behaviors in the resource allocation task in Experiment 1 but failed in 
Experiment 2. There might be two possible explanations. Firstly, ToM contributes to 
the process of overriding self-interest (Yu et al., 2016), but not likely to the process of 
suppressing the envious responses. Children in previous studies employing UG or DG 
just needed to consider whether to favor themselves or to conform to social norms, 
which was related with their ToM (e.g., Wu & Su, 2014). However, creating a 
disadvantageous inequity by themselves might rely more on inhibition rather than 
mentalizing, as shown by the insignificant relation between ToM and self-
disadvantaging choices in Experiment 2 and the insignificant mediation effect of ToM 
on the relation between age and impartial behaviors in Experiment 1. Participants 
would struggle a lot between giving more to self, no one and other. They might try to 
infer how others would think about each choice they were to make in the resource 
allocation task, but the final formation of choice depended on IC instead of ToM, 
which was also supported by Steinbeis and colleagues’ study (2012). Thus, future 
studies need to further examine the neural mechanisms or the time course of impartial 
decision making with other technologies, such as neural oscillation through EEG. 
Another possibility was that ToM did play a role in impartial behaviors though 
there were only two choices, i.e., equity or other-benefit. But the IToMP task in the 
current study might have failed to capture certain aspects of ToM, as ToM was a 
multi-dimensional construct, which consisted of intention, emotion, desire, 
knowledge, etc. (Wellman, 2002). Individuals’ fair behaviors were the result of a dual 
process involving emotion and cognition (Beugré, 2009). The IToMP task used in the 
present study only reflected children’s abilities to infer others’ knowledge state, which 
was a cognitive component of ToM.  
Contributions and limitations 
The current study examined the cognitive mechanisms underlying the 
development of self-disadvantaging behaviors over the preschool period. The findings 
of the current study showed that IC played a critical role in the implementation of 
self-disadvantaging behaviors when this implementation required control over 
selfishness and envy, and ToM might also have some influence by promoting 
children’s inference of others’ social preference. The self-disadvantaging behavior is 
at least partially attributed to impartiality, a form of fairness (Choshen-Hillel et al., 
2015; Shaw, 2013). Previous studies also suggested a role of IC as well as ToM in 
other forms of fairness, like equity (e.g., Wang & Su, 2013) or equality (e.g., Blake et 
al., 2015; Takagishi et al., 2010). All the findings suggested that humans’ 
understanding of different forms of fairness might share the same cognitive 
mechanisms. The development of individuals’ behaviors that met social expectations 
is largely correlated with their improvement of IC, and probably associated with the 
maturation of prefrontal cortex (Steinbeis et al., 2012). As age increases, children 
become better in IC, which helps them endorse fairness more to behave adaptively in 
social interactions.  
However, the current study suffered from some limitations. First, it employed a 
correlational design to examine the relationship between IC and children’s self-
disadvantaging behaviors, and future research could employ manipulations like taxing 
cognitive control (Steinbeis, 2018) or priming (Steinbeis & Over, 2017) and test a 
potential causal relationship. Second, future studies could also employ other 
paradigms such as story tasks (e.g., Mills & Keil, 2008) to study children’s 
developing notions of impartiality and compare findings obtained with different 
paradigms on the developmental trajectory of impartial behaviors. 
Practical implications 
Although some previous studies emphasized the important role of social-
cognitive abilities in promoting children’s prosociality (e.g., Sally & Hill, 2006), our 
findings as well as other studies (e.g., Steinbeis et al., 2012) highlight the importance 
of improving children’s executive function in morality educational programs. To 
behave prosocially, inferring others’ desires or reasoning how others think about the 
decision was important. Other processes such as inhibiting undesirable responses, 
regulating negative emotions, and making flexible decisions to meet the demand of 
specific situation, which relied largely on executive control, were also essential to the 
actualization of prosocial behaviors (Schonert-Reichl et al., 2015). Thus, instead of 
only telling children what is good and what is right, teachers could also include 
training programs such as those for children’s inhibitory control or socio-cognitive 
abilities to promote children’s morality in social interactions.  
Conclusion 
To make a relatively satisfactory decision in a real-life dilemma where equity is 
in conflict with efficiency, preschoolers would be more likely to make a self-
disadvantageous inequitable decision with self-interest involved as age increases. IC, 
which matures with age, could be a more direct determinant of the age-related 
differences. It plays a substantial role in implementing this self-disadvantaging 
behavior because it helps to inhibit children’s impulses like selfishness and envy in 
order to behave in a more socially desirable way. 
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Supplementary material 
 
Method 
Resource Allocation Task 
Each child in the first-party condition was asked to complete a filler task (a game 
of feeding animals) under the instruction of the experimenter. Then the child was told 
by the experimenter that she would leave to check another child’s performance. Later, 
the experimenter came back, and the participant was told: 
Congratulations! You and a girl (or boy) named Hua (or Ming) each did a good job and got the 
same score in the game. And now we want to give you two some bells as a prize. Look, do you like 
these bells? (Show a total of 5 bells to the child.) But I do not know how many to give each of you. 
Could you help me? (OK.)  
You will decide how many bells each of you will get. There are five. We have one for you, 
one for Hua (or Ming), one for you, and one for Hua (or Ming). Oh, there is one left. Do you think 
it should be given to Hua (or Ming), yourself, or no one? [The participant was asked to place the 
last bell into one of the three boxes with labels on their own. The order of “Hua (or Ming)” and 
“yourself” in the narration was counterbalanced between subjects.] If you decide to give it to no 
one, the bell will be put away and rust, which means no one can play with it.  
The participant in the third-party condition were directly asked to help how to 
allocate the fifth bell. The experimenter told: 
Just now, two children named Hua (or Ming) and Hong (or Mao) completed a game to feed 
animals. They each did a good job and got the same score. Thus we want to give them some bells 
as a prize. But I don’t know how many to give each of them. Could you help me? (OK.) 
You will decide how many bells each of them will get. There are five. We have one for Hua (or 
Ming), one for Hong (or Mao), one for Hua (or Ming), and one for Hong (or Mao). Oh, there is one 
left. Do you think it should be given to Hua (or Ming), Hong (or Mao), or no one? If you decide to 
give it to no one, the bell will be put away and rust, which means no one can play with it. 
“Hua” and “Hong” are common Chinese names for girls, while “Ming” and “Mao” 
are common Chinese names for boys. And the order of “Hua (or Ming)” and “Hong (or 
Mao)” in the narration was counterbalanced between subjects. Matching genders would 
prevent a gender preference from becoming a confounding variable (Renno & Shutts, 
2015). 
 
Future likelihood ordering task 
This task was employed to train each child to indicate estimated probabilities from 
1 to 10 demonstrated by stacked bars in an arrow for subsequent assessment of ToM 
(Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Harvey, 2014). The scale was subdivided into four sections: 
definitely will not (Bar 1), might (Bars 2 to 5), probably will (Bars 6 to 9), and definitely 
will (Bar 10). The participant learned an example trial for training. In the training trial, 
the experimenter showed four 3 × 3 in. pictures randomly placed in a 2 × 2 grid next to 
the arrow scale on the table, each showing a bucket filled with water to about half the 
depth and tilting at varying angles. The participant, with the help of the experimenter, 
placed each picture adjacent to the matching section under the arrow scale in order of 
increasing probability of the water spilling out from the bucket to the right, as the arrow 
pointed to. Then the participant took at least two similar test trials independently. In the 
event that the participant failed one of the two test trials, a third test trial would be added. 
All the participants either passed the first two test trials or made the third right and 
proceeded to the following task. 
  
Results 
 
Table 1S 
Correlation matrix of variables in Experiment 1 
Variables Across conditions 
(N = 99) 
 First-party condition 
(N = 54) 
 Third-party condition 
(N = 45) 
2 3 4 5  2 3 4 5  2 3 4 5 
1. Age (months) -.06 .40** .52** -.06  -.10 .44** .57** .31*  -.01 .36* .48** -.33* 
2. Actual pictures  -.27** -.11 .04   -.14 -.05 -.16   -.49** -.24 -.13 
3. Prototypical pictures   .30** -.04    .18 .27*    .43** -.35* 
4. IC accuracy rate    -.08     .57**     -.51** 
5. Children’s choices    1     1     1 
Note: *p < .05 (two-tailed), **p < .01 (two-tailed). Children’s choices were coded into a binary variable (1 or 0: to give to other or not) across the 
conditions and for the third-party condition, while an ordinal variable (0 to 2: self-benefit, equity or other-benefit) for the first-party condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2S 
Correlation matrix of variables in Experiment 2 
Variables Across conditions 
(N = 72) 
 Self-disadvantaging condition  
(N = 41) 
 Third-party condition 
(N = 31) 
2 3 4 5  2 3 4 5  2 3 4 5 
1. Age 
(months) 
.09 .25* .40** -.05  .26 .20 .35* .02  -.08 .35† .46** -.15 
2. Actual 
pictures 
 -.34** .02 .07   -.11 .26 -.06   -.59** -.29 .20 
3. Prototypical 
pictures 
  .10 -.26*    -.15 -.10    .36* -.34† 
4. IC accuracy 
rate 
   .03     .37*     -.45* 
5. Self-
disadvantaging 
or equity 
   1     1     1 
Note: †p < .10 (two-tailed), *p ≤ .05 (two-tailed), **p < .01 (two-tailed). Children’s choices were coded into a binary variable (1 or 0: self-
disadvantaging or equity) across the conditions, for the self-disadvantaging and third-party conditions. 
General discussion of cultural and social-economic differences 
Yet many studies about fairness-related behaviors and its development recruited 
participants from Westernized and industrialized nations like the United States (e.g., 
Shaw, Choshen-Hillel, & Caruso, 2016) and Germany (e.g., Schmidt, Svetlova, Johe, 
& Tomasello, 2016). Regarding to economic and cultural variations in human fairness 
(Blake et al., 2015; Henrich et al., 2010), how participants from an Eastern and 
developing country in a collective cultural background would behave is unclear. 
The current findings of the self-disadvantaging phenomenon were consistent with 
previous studies (Choshen-Hillel et al., 2015; Shaw et al., 2016). It indicated that this 
phenomenon is fairly robust across cultures. But there might also be some cultural 
specificity in human fairness (Blake et al., 2015) and in resolution to conflicts 
between equity and efficiency. We compared the data in previous studies from 
different countries as below (see Table 3S). As the data suggested, children in a 
developed country with individualist culture (US) tended to waste the extra resource 
and uphold the equity principle, while children in developing countries with 
collectivist culture (China and Uganda) (Rarick et al., 2013) were more likely to give 
it to a non-self recipient. This descriptive analysis showed consistent results with 
those in previous studies, which indicated that the magnitude of inequity aversion 
varies in economic statuses and cultural norms (e.g., Henrich et al., 2010; Huppert et 
al., 2018). Individualist and developed societies emphasize independent effort or 
personal achievement (Berry, 1971), and might endow less weight on efficiency 
principle, especially when it is in conflict with equity principle. However, collectivist 
and developing societies concern much more about responsibility and group welfare 
(Ramamoorthy & Carroll, 1998). Thus, greater proportions of children in China and 
Uganda than US gave the extra reward to the other no matter with self-interest 
involved or not (Paulus, 2015; Shaw et al., 2016; Shaw & Olson, 2012). This implied 
that fairness is not solely an innate product of mind, but shaped by cultures and social 
norms (Henrich et al., 2010). 
Table 3S  
Comparison of impartial behaviors among preschoolers between different countries 
across conditions 
 
Country 
First-party condition  Third-party 
condition Two choices  Three choices  
Waste Other  Self Waste Other  Waste Inequity 
America (Shaw et 
al., 2016; Shaw & 
Olson, 2012) 
72% 
(47/65) 
28% 
(18/65) 
 56% 
(46/82) 
20% 
(16/82) 
24% 
(20/82) 
 60% 
(14/24) 
40% 
(10/24) 
China (the current 
study) 
 
51% 
(21/41) 
49% 
(20/41) 
 37% 
(20/54) 
35% 
(19/54) 
28% 
(15/54) 
 40% 
(18/45) 
60% 
(27/45) 
Uganda (Paulus, 
2015) 
— —  — — —  30% 
(10/33) 
70% 
(23/33) 
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